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This paper examines political, institutional and economic determinants of exchange 
rate performance in less developed countries in the 1990s. It models exchange rate 
depreciations as two separate processes, firstly a process determining whether a 
currency is devalued and secondly a process determining the size of devaluation. The 
paper utilizes the most recent political and institutional data as well as a new index of 
central bank governor turnover in the 1990s to examine the relative importance of 
political and economic factors. While institutional and political factors dominate the 
probability of devaluation, the size of devaluations is mainly governed by economic 
factors.  
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Academics’ and policy-makers’ interest in developing country exchange rate regimes 
and their performance received a major boost in the 1990s. Firstly the decade saw the 
emergence of a large number of new (and newly convertible) currencies following the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. Choosing an exchange rate regime, which could deliver 
monetary stability was an important aspect of successfully managing economic 
transition. Several governments opted for currency pegs to affect inflation expectations 
and “borrow” credibility. A second major trend in the 1990s was financial liberalization 
in less developed countries (LDCs). This resulted in increasing financial integration and 
capital mobility, but also in increasing financial fragility: The 1990s saw several periods 
of turmoil on the foreign exchange markets, when central banks were faced with such 
massive speculative attacks that many currency pegs had to be abandoned.  
 
Academic research on exchange rate regimes reflects that exchange rates are determined 
both by government preferences and market pressures. The literature on regime choice 
examines the economic, political and institutional factors that predispose a country 
towards choosing a floating exchange rate, a soft peg, a hard peg or monetary union.
1 
The relevant institutions and economic factors are drawn from the literature on optimal 
currency areas
2, the “fear of floating” hypothesis
3 and political economy arguments.
4 
The literature on currency crises on the other hand looks at the interaction between 
governments and markets. It initially focused on inconsistencies between the announced 
peg regime and the monetary and fiscal policies implemented by the country.
5 More 
recently the currency crises literature has also incorporated political
6 and financial
7 
institutions, which determine the cost of peg defence, and the way in which politicians 
discount future benefits from maintaining a peg versus the short-term costs of defending 
the currency against a speculative attack.
8 This paper contributes to both these 
  2literatures by examining the factors that determine whether a country maintains peg 
stability in a given year and if there is a devaluation, what factors determine the size of 
the devaluation.  
 
The first contribution of the paper is the statistical examination of the most recent data 
on politics and institutions in a panel of LDCs, which are concurrent with the emerging 
market currency crises of the 1990s. For the question of whether peg stability is 
maintained the focus is on the credibility of the commitment to the peg. A very 
important explanatory variable is an index of central bank governor turnover in the 
1990s. This was constructed for this study to avoid using 1980s data, which are both 
limited to non-transition countries and are in many cases out of date, given moves in 
many countries to improve central bank independence. While the question of political 
stability has been the focus of a number of previous studies on speculative attacks
9 and 
regime choice
10, the question of central bank independence has been neglected or been 
examined with 1980s data
11. However, if the central bank is charged with maintaining 
peg stability and stands above the political fray (as for example in Estonia), even high 
political instability may not feed into devaluation expectations. 
 
The second contribution of the paper is that unlike the regime choice literature it does 
not use multinomial logit analysis (somewhat arbitrarily) distinguishing between 
“intermediate” and “freely floating” regimes. Instead a political economy model of the 
size of devaluations is estimated. Devaluation size should reflect economic factors, 
however, the credibility of the government’s commitment to maintaining monetary and 
fiscal discipline may also influence the size of the devaluation.  
 
The third contribution arises from disentangling the decision to devalue from the size of 
devaluation. This helps to give a more nuanced picture of institutional factors, which 
  3may have a negative effect on the probability of devaluation, but which can have a 
positive effect on the size of devaluation if it occurs. For example a democratic 
government facing an election is likely to prioritise internal over external objectives and 
therefore unlikely to impose the cost of pegging on the electorate. However, it is also 
unlikely to permit a catastrophic devaluation, as it would fear being punished for 
economic mismanagement. Such ambiguous effects of the institutional environment on 
exchange rate stability could not be picked up by previous studies of the effect of 
politics on currency pressure using linear regression analyses.
12  
 
The study is based on a panel of less developed countries from 1990 to 2000. There are 
a number of reasons for looking at developing countries separately from developed 
countries. Currency pegs in LDCs are generally unilateral. The stability of LDC 
exchange rate pegs therefore relies on the countries’ economic performance and the 
credibility of their governments. In the absence of timely and reliable economic data, 
investors and speculators are likely to focus on the preferences and commitment 
mechanisms entered into by LDC governments when predicting the stability of pegs. 
Political and institutional factors should therefore take on a special significance in the 
LDC context.  
 
It is shown that institutional factors dominate whether or not a devaluation occurs, even 
when economic control variables are included in the regression. Central to peg 
maintenance is the credibility of the commitment to exchange rate stability. This 
credibility is primarily a function of the degree of independence of the central bank, but 
also of the government’s position in the polity and its time horizon and the level of 
financial development. Another significant factor is economic size, as argued by the 
literature on regime choice. If a government does not maintain a peg, however, the size 
of the devaluation appears to be mainly determined by the degree of internal 
  4imbalances, the need to restore competitiveness and the degree of capital mobility, with 
some scope for using foreign exchange reserves to limit the size of devaluations. The 
empirical evidence for the importance of political factors in determining the size of 
devaluation is less strong, but an interesting result of modelling the devaluation problem 
as a two separate processes is that some variables change sign. While democracies are 
less likely to maintain a peg, they are also more likely to have smaller devaluations. 
Autocracies, which can postpone devaluations because they are able to impose the costs 
of peg defence on the population, tend to have higher devaluations when they occur. 
Financial sector development lowers the probability of devaluation, but if a more 
financially developed country is forced into a devaluation, it is likely to experience a 
major crisis.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the relevant economic and institutional 
variables governing the probability and size of devaluations are identified through a 
review of the literatures on regime choice and currency crises and some descriptive 
statistics are presented. Section 3 discusses the methodology for this paper. Section 4 
presents the results on the factors determining the probability of devaluation and the 
size of devaluations and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
II: Data Section 
1   Dependent variable: 
The dependent variable in the analysis is the change in the log of the annual average 
exchange rate vis-à-vis US$, unless a peg to another hard currency (Euro [DM, FF], 
SDR etc) is explicitly declared.
13 For the bivariate analysis the variable is categorized 
with all revaluations and peg stability as defined by the IMF (fluctuations within a 2% 
band) making up the “no devaluation” category and devaluations greater than 2% 
  5making up the “devaluation” category. Overall about a third of the observations are in 
the “no devaluation” category. In the regression analysis studying the size of 
devaluation, the dependent variable is the change in the log of the annual average 
exchange rate in those countries, in which the devaluation of the average annual 
exchange rate exceeds 2%.
14  
 
2   Institutional Factors 
According to the second-generation currency crises literature the main determinant of 
whether or not a currency crisis occurs is whether the authorities are willing to bear the 
political costs of defending the currency. The size of devaluation on the other hand 
depends on the change in monetary policy once the peg is abandoned, i.e. whether and 
to what degree the authorities will relax monetary policy once the constraints imposed 
by the peg are eased. Peg defence in a developing country context with limited foreign 
exchange reserves and without multilateral support involves raising the interest rate to 
stem capital outflows and (over time) correct any loss of competitiveness caused by past 
inflation differentials. There are several reasons why the authorities may resist such a 
rise in interest rates.  
 
Time Horizons: According to macro-economic feedback models, the government 
resists interest rate rises because of their effects on the real economy, causing 
unemployment, bankruptcies and hence slower growth.
15 The authorities’ willingness to 
bear these costs depends mainly on the time horizon of the policy-maker, who weighs 
up the (short-term) costs of peg defence against the (longer-term) benefits of exchange 
rate stability. One option of demonstrating commitment to a peg is to delegate peg 
maintenance to an independent central bank set up to maximize welfare over a longer 
time horizon than politicians.
16 The time horizon of politicians in turn depends on the 
stability of the polity: whether and when they have to face an election and how likely it 
  6is that they will lose power.
17 In this study the question of time horizons will be 
captured with the following proxies: 
Central Bank Governor Turnover: it was impossible to find a comprehensive dataset 
on the degree of central bank independence for developing countries in the 1990s. The 
Cukierman [1992] dataset of the de jure independence of central banks is a 
geographically limited data-set for the 1980s, although it has been updated with a 
number of entries for post-Soviet countries by Cukierman et al [1992 and 2001]. 
However, several authors have pointed out that de jure independence may not be a good 
proxy for actual independence, particularly in a developing county context.
18 Cukierman 
et al [1992] therefore developed an alternative proxy for actual independence based on 
the average turnover of central bank governors in a given period. A high turnover rate is 
taken to indicate a low degree of central bank independence: if governors are easily 
replaced then they are less likely pursue policies that are disadvantageous to the 
government
19. The proxy appears relevant in the context of time horizons of the 
monetary authority: the higher the turnover rate, the less a governor will gain from 
pursuing long-term policies, as he will be punished for imposing short-term costs
20. 
Using the period average of governor turnover rather than the year of governor change-
over limits the endogeneity problem arising from the potential of governors being 
sacked as a political response to devaluation. The turnover rate variable was not 
available for the 1990s and was therefore constructed as the number of central bank 




Regarding the time horizons of politicians there are a number of potential proxies. 
However, some of these proxies tend to be highly correlated with each other and are 
therefore not used together in the regressions.
22  
  7Degree of democracy: Democratic regimes are more accountable to the electorate than 
autocratic regimes and face the risk of being replaced at elections (or through a break-up 
of a ruling coalition) if unemployment rises and growth plummets. Democracies are 
therefore likely to be sensitive to the short-term cost of peg defence and likely to 
discount the long-term benefits of a stable currency more strongly than autocracies.
23 
On the other hand a large devaluation would undermine the government’s reputation for 
competent economic management and democracies are likely to be more sensitive to 
this than stable autocracies.  
Concentration of political power: Among democracies the least stable form of 
government under deteriorating economic conditions is a multi-party coalition, as under 
economic pressure individual parties tend to withdraw from the coalition agreement for 
fear of being associated with economic mismanagement. On the other extreme are 
single-party governments with large majorities, as they are unlikely to be quickly 
replaced in response to electoral discontent and can therefore more easily absorb short-
term economic costs.
24  
Veto-player changeover: This variable from the Beck et al [2001] database records the 
proportion of political veto-players (president / government / second house), which are 
replaced in a year. If the variable is used as an annual indicator of the extent of political 
instability, there is a potential reverse causality problem, as a government is unlikely to 
survive a catastrophic devaluation. It was therefore not used in the regressions studying 
the probability of devaluation.  If averaged over the period 1990 –2000 period (or 
whichever sub-period the country existed) it proxies for the time horizon of politicians, 
with high turnover rates indicating that politicians have little scope for maximizing 
welfare over a long time horizon. However, the averaged variable was not significant in 
any specification of the regressions and is therefore omitted from the reported results. 
Veto player turnover can; however, be used in the regressions on devaluation size to 
study the effect of political instability on the government’s ability to limit the size of 
  8devaluation.
25 The variable is only significant in purely political models of devaluation 
size, as soon as economic indicators are added to the model the statistical significance 
of the variable disappears and the explanatory power of the model improves greatly. It 
is therefore omitted from the reported results. 
Election Year: A government is less likely to undertake politically costly defence of the 
exchange rate and is more likely to use monetary and exchange rate policy to boost 
employment when they face an election. The effect of an election year on the size of 
devaluation on the other hand is ambiguous – before an election a large devaluation 
would lower the probability of re-election. On the other hand after an election an 
incoming government may choose to boost the economy by devaluing, particularly if 
the new administration does not feel bound by the commitments made by its 
predecessors. The variable takes the value one if there was a legislative and/or an 
executive election in the year.
26  
 
Banking sector instability: According to banking sector models of currency crises, a 
higher interest rate destabilizes weak banking systems, as weak debtors fall behind with 
their payments and depositors start to withdraw in response to lower portfolio quality.
27 
Finding a proxy capturing the solidity of the banking system in developing countries is 
difficult, as data about the proportions of bad loans are very limited (both in terms of 
countries and years for which they are available) and often do not accurately reflect the 
true extent of problem loans, as different countries have different regulations regarding 
the declaration of bad loans.
28 Therefore a number of broader measures of financial 
fragility and financial development are currently used in the academic literature on 
financial and currency crises. 
Banking crisis dummy: The incidence of a banking crisis in an economy may be 
endogenous to the occurrence of a currency crisis: banking and currency crises tend to 
occur together.
29 The direction of causality may run either way, as the currency crises 
  9could be caused by the weakness in the banking system. On the other hand a 
devaluation may destabilize a banking sector which has borrowed in hard currency to 
make loans in domestic currency. For this paper a dummy variable was used taking the 
value 1 if there was a banking crisis starting or ongoing in the previous year, to avoid 
the causality problem surrounding twin crises
30. However, as the variable is never 
statistically significant it is not reported in the results tables below. 
Financial Depth: Broad money as a ratio of GDP is sometimes used to measure the 
level of a country’s financial development. However, in financially underdeveloped 
countries a large component of broad money is currency held outside the banking 
system. Demetriades and Hussain [1996] suggest that any measure of financial 
development should exclude currency in circulation from the broad money stock. In this 
paper (M3–M1)/GDP from the World Development Indicators is used as a proxy for 
financial development. Banking systems, which are more developed and perceived to be 
more stable, will attract a larger amount of long-term deposits. Excluding sight deposits 
also reduces potential endogeneity problems, as people withdraw short term deposits in 
the face of an emerging “twin crisis”.  
 
A number of alternative proxies were also considered, which might capture weaknesses 
in the banking system. Liquid reserves / total assets in banking system: A high level of 
reserves could be indicative of a financially repressed or unstable banking system in 
which banks are increasing their cash positions in anticipation of bank runs
31. On the 
other hand, a high level of reserves may help to prevent liquidity problems in the 
banking sector, so the effect of this variable is ambiguous and indeed it is not significant 
in any of the regressions. Interest rate spread (lending minus deposit rate): This is 
another measure of the efficiency and competitiveness of the banking system. However, 
the interest rate spread also tends to be linked to inflation performance, so it is not a 
pure indicator of banking sector performance and is therefore omitted from the 
  10regressions. Bank Ratings: Default and operational risk ratings for banks would appear 
to be a highly relevant measure of vulnerability to interest rate changes. However, 
ratings have been shown to be highly pro-cyclical.
32 For example in the Asian crisis 
country and corporate ratings deteriorated markedly after the crisis had broken, making 
this variable potentially endogenous. Standard and Poor’s information on financial 




These variables are based on the “optimal currency area”
33, the “fear of floating”
34 and 
political economy arguments. The theory of optimal currency areas sets up a cost-
benefit analysis for a country based on how exposed its economy is to exchange rate 
fluctuations and how costly it is to address trade deficits through internal adjustments 
rather than changes in the exchange rate. There is a caveat, however, that the 
characteristics of size of the economy, openness and the level of development can be 
highly correlated. 
GDP: larger economies tend to have some influence on the price of traded goods.
35 
Large countries are therefore not as exposed to international price shocks and therefore 
have less to gain from fixing their exchange rates. 
Openness is a measure of how exposed the economy is to fluctuations in the exchange 
rate.
36 In relatively closed economies exchange rate fluctuations only affect a few 
internationally traded commodities, making pegging less attractive.  
GDP/Capita: is sometimes used as a measure of diversification of the economy and 
hence a measure of how exposed the economy is to foreign demand shocks. In 
diversified economies disturbances in individual markets will offset each other. While a 
diversified economy is less likely to peg, diversification is likely to make a float 
relatively smooth. The main problem with this variable is its high correlation with other 
  11explanatory variables, such as its correlation coefficient of 0.63 with the financial 
development variable and a correlation coefficient of 0.47 with the openness variable. 
The correlation coefficient between GDP and GDP per capita is 0.24. GDP per capita 
is never significant in the regressions alongside the other indicators of preferences and 
is therefore omitted from the reported regressions. 
Terms of trade shocks: This variable captures diversification of trade as well as 
pressures to devalue to restore competitiveness
37. Countries with well-diversified 
geographical and product group trade patterns are less likely to be affected by external 
shocks. Lagged changes in import and export prices are used to avoid picking up effects 
of price shocks linked to a devaluation. As an alternative a variable capturing the size of 
the current account surplus / deficit is used in some regressions, which is discussed 
below. 
 
Fear of Floating: According to the fear of floating hypothesis countries there are 
multiple reasons why countries prefer to suppress variation in their exchange rates.
38 
Countries with unhedged foreign currency denominated debt (pervasive in emerging 
markets) have an incentive to peg to the currency in which they have borrowed. A 
devaluation compromises the country’s ability to service its debt, as revenues are 
generated in local currency.  
Foreign currency denominated external debt/GDP
39: It is argued that a high level of 
foreign currency denominated debt should increase a government’s commitment to a 
peg. On the other hand, a high level of foreign debt also makes a government more 
vulnerable to changes in investor confidence. At times of crises the supply of external 
funds becomes inelastic, risk premia rise and make it difficult to service the debt.
40 
Market forces may therefore be more important than the government’s preferences.  
 
  12A second reason for governments to limit exchange rate fluctuations arises from a 
combination of lack of credibility and the pass-through from exchange rates to prices, 
which interferes with inflation targeting. A high degree of dollarisation of the economy 
indicates such credibility problems: In countries with a history of high inflation and 
frequent devaluations savers tend to hold hard currency deposits instead of deposits in 
the local currency. If there are restrictions on hard currency deposits or the banking 
system is fragile, asset substitution takes the form of “currency dollarisation”, where 
people hold foreign cash in under the mattress savings instead of local currency deposits 
or cash.
41 This lowers the amount of domestic currency in circulation and exaggerates 
the inflationary effects of expansionary monetary policies. Maintaining a stable 
relationship between the domestic currency and the hard currency of choice in the 
country is often hoped to reverse or at least prevent further dollarisation. However, 
given the two aspects of dollarisation the more obvious “deposit dollarisation” and 
“currency dollarisation”, which is more difficult to measure, there are no comprehensive 
and comparable datasets of the degree of dollarisation in less developed countries and 
this aspect of “fear of floating” is not examined statistically in this paper.
42  
 
In political economy the question of political preferences is discussed in addition to 
preferences based on the economic structure.  
Left-wing dummy: Left wing governments are seen as more focused on internal 
(employment / growth) rather than external objectives.
43 This variable was developed 
for the OECD context and is based on words in the party name such as conservative / 
socialist / labour. It may therefore not capture the political preferences of developing 
countries, where the political spectrum is more likely to be split along ethnic or 
nationalistic lines than a traditional left-right spectrum. The proxy takes the value 1 in 
each year the Beck et al [2001] database records that a left-wing government was in 
power.  
  13 
4   Conflict between pegs and domestic economic conditions 
The first three variables are based on the first generation currency crisis literature, in 
which crises are caused by a contradiction between the announced peg and the 
government’s fiscal and monetary policies
44. The fourth variable (economic growth) is 
included according to second-generation macro-economic feedback models, in which 
the government is concerned about domestic economic performance and abandons the 
peg to concentrate on internal balance. All data are from the World Development 
Indicators. 
Fiscal Deficit: Large deficits (lagged) may indicate a need for seigniorage finance, 
endangering the peg. However, as fiscal data are not widely available, this variable is 
not used in the regressions, but (lagged) inflation is used directly.  
Inflation: Countries whose inflation rates diverge from those of the anchor countries 
will find it difficult to maintain currency stability over extended periods of time. Lagged 
inflation is used, as current inflation will be affected by devaluations through rising 
import prices. 
Log of foreign exchange reserves: According to Krugmann’s [1976] model of currency 
crises one of the leading indicators of currency crises is the loss of foreign exchange 
reserves as domestic credit grows. The variable is lagged by one year to circumvent 
endogeneity problems, as a speculative attack will deplete foreign exchange reserves. 
Although the currency crises in the 1990s have shown that central bank reserves in 
LDCs are not sufficient to avert a currency crisis in the face of a concerted speculative 
attack, foreign exchange interventions may help to limit the size of a devaluation.  
Recession: Lagged GDP growth reflects the government’s temptation to inflate the 
economy to achieve internal balance (current GDP growth may be endogenous to a 
devaluation occurring – see e.g. the recessions after the Tequila and Asian crises).  
  14Current account imbalance: Large current account deficit (lagged) may indicate a need 
to devalue to achieve external balance. The lagged variable is used, as the cost of 
imports increases and export revenues decrease immediately after the devaluation event, 
as part of the J-curve effect. The current account variable is used alternately with the 
terms of trade shocks variable. 
 
5  Liquidity of the foreign exchange market and central bank reserves 
Variables capturing liquidity should be included to control for the magnitude of capital 
outflows during a period of currency instability. The lower capital mobility the greater 
the scope for using foreign exchange reserves rather than the interest rate to defend the 
peg. There are a number of variables capturing the liquidity in a market.
 45 High bid-
offer spreads may reflect explicit transaction costs such as taxes, inventory-carrying 
costs and order-processing costs by dealers, as well as oligopolistic market structures. 
High transactions costs lead to thin markets. The problem with using this measure is 
that foreign exchange risk is part of the transaction costs implicit in bid-ask spreads 
(through inventory-carrying costs). Turnover ratios and trading volumes measure the 
breadth of a market. However, there are few data available for OTC markets like the 
foreign exchange market. Market efficiency coefficients measure the liquidity of a 
market by looking at how new information affects prices in the short term – how 
smoothly and quickly do prices adjust to their equilibrium level? However, this measure 
tends to deteriorate in advance of episodes of currency crises due to foreign exchange 
market in interventions (damping effects) or inaccurate price determination due to 
uncertainty regarding fundamentals (excessive volatility). As these traditional measures 
of liquidity are either unavailable or inappropriate in the context of currency crises, a 
crude proxy of market size might be more appropriate. Size of financial market (M3): 
Relatively large and developed financial markets are likely to receive more foreign 
speculator interest, than small and underdeveloped financial markets. However, this 
  15variable is highly correlated with GDP (the correlation between logM3 and logGDP is 
0.96) and is therefore omitted from the regressions.  
 
6   Control variables 
A further area of research in the field of currency crises is that of contagion, that is 
financial instability spreading from one country to its trade partners or among countries 
perceived to have similar characteristics.
46  
Year 1997 dummy: Of the various year-dummies introduced into regressions, the only 
significant contagion effects are observed in the Asian crisis. 
 
7   Descriptive Statistics 
Insert table 1 here 
The descriptive statistics presented in table 1 lend preliminary support to most of the 
hypotheses explored above. Country years without devaluations have on average lower 
central bank governor turnover than country years in which a devaluation is 
experienced. The difference in the degree of democracy is even more pronounced: the 
mean in the no devaluation cases is highly autocratic (-7.288 with a minimum of –10), 
whereas the mean in the devaluation countries is democratic, even if not highly 
democratic (1.851 with a maximum of +10). The difference in concentration of power 
and election years is not as prominent, but the no devaluation cases have a lower 
proportion of elections and a greater concentration of power as expected.  
 
Of the variables capturing preferences no strong conclusions can be drawn from the 
small differences in the size of the economy. However, the no devaluation cases are on 
average more open economies. The “fear of floating” hypothesis is contradicted as the 
no devaluation cases have a lower ratio of external debt to GDP than the devaluation 
  16  17
cases. The other economic variables presented show that the degree of vulnerability as 
captured by the first generation currency crises variables (inflation and fiscal deficit) is 
markedly lower in the no-devaluation cases than in the devaluation cases. The second 
generation variables also receive some support as export prices in the no devaluation 
cases were increasing faster and growth was higher on average than in the no 
devaluation cases. However, there are no prominent differences in the levels of foreign 
exchange reserves or the size of the current account deficits. Finally the year 1997 saw a 
higher than average proportion of devaluations. 
 
III: Methodology 
The main focus of this paper is to examine the differences between the factors that 
govern whether a currency remains stable or not and the factors that determine the size 
of a devaluation if it does take place. The methodology chosen is to analyse the first 
question (of peg stability) with a panel logit analysis, which examines what factors 
affect the odds ratio of a devaluation event occurring.
47 The regression takes the form: 
(1)    Ln [P /(1-P)] = β0 + β1 x1 + β2 x2 + β3x3  +… + σu + εit   
P is the probability of getting outcome A and (1-P) is the probability of not getting 
outcome A. The ratio P / (1-P) is the odds ratio and denotes the odds in favour of getting 
outcome A. The probability of the devaluation occurring is modelled as a function of a 
range of fixed effects from the independent x variables, plus a random effect (σu) plus 
an error term (εit). 
 
The dataset is in the form of a panel with observations for up to 98 countries for up to 
11 years (1990 – 2000). Therefore the logit function used is a cross-sectional time series 
logit. In the panel cross sectional effects dominate the time series effects as most of the 
institutional indicators do not change over time in a given country (e.g. the concentration of power variable tends to be stable over time and the central bank 
independence indicator is calculated as an average of 10 years and has no in-group 
variance). Similarly there is no in-group variation in the dependent variable in 25 
countries, which either remain stable exchange rates throughout the period (e.g. Saudi 
Arabia) or devalue every year (e.g. Turkey). Therefore a random effects logit is 
estimated.  
 
Different combinations of the variables discussed above are used as explanatory 
variables. In the cases where different proxies capture similar institutions or are highly 
correlated alternative proxies were used in different regressions. The first set of 
regressions focuses on institutional and political factors only. The second set of 
regressions compares the political model to alternative economic models. The third set 
of regressions uses both political and economic explanatory factors for a full model. 
The fourth set of regressions uses the same combinations of explanatory variables as in 
the full model to examine what governs the size of devaluation in country-years where 
the change in the annual average exchange rate exceeds 2%, using a linear regression.  
 
IV: Results 
1  Factors affecting the probability of devaluation 
1.1 A Political Model 
Insert table 2 here 
The proxy for central bank independence is highly significant in all the 
regressions looking at institutional variables only. Any increase in the turnover of 
central bank governors (interpreted as a high degree of political interference in 
monetary policy) strongly raises the probability of devaluation and the coefficient is 
relatively robust in different specifications of the regressions. 
  18The degree of democracy is also a highly significant explanatory variable. More 
democratic countries have a raised probability of devaluation, suggesting that more 
democratic governments find it more difficult to impose the cost of peg defence on their 
populations. On the other hand it is possible that the degree of democracy here proxies 
for other factors of development. 
Regressions 1:3 and 1:4 provide support for the hypothesis that strong 
governments (either due to an autocratic regime or a democratically elected government 
which faces little effective opposition) can avoid devaluations, as costs of adjustment 
can be imposed on the populations. Concentration of power has a negative and 
significant effect on the probability of devaluation.  
There is also support for the hypothesis that short time horizons raise the 
probability of devaluation with election years being statistically significant explanatory 
variables (regressions 1:1 to 1:4). Another explanation for the result would be that an 
incoming government does not feel bound by the commitments regarding peg stability 
made by a previous government.
 48  
Neither regression 1:2 nor regression 1:4 lends any support to the political 
economy argument that left-wing governments tend to be more focused on internal 
balance rather than exchange rate targets. While the hypothesis may be confirmed in a 
developed country sample, in LDCs the party name (on which the variable is based) 
does not appear to give much information on the government’s exchange rate regime 
preferences or the perceived credibility of its commitment to the peg.  
Regressions 1:3 and 1:4 suggest that more developed banking sectors are less 
vulnerable to attacks. This means that the aspect of the variable, which captures the 
stability of the financial system, dominates that of foreign speculator interest and 
activity on a country’s foreign exchange market.  
 
  19To compare the political model to its alternatives regression 1:5 uses the economic 
factors that describe preferences instead of institutional variables. As expected larger 
and more diversified economies are less likely to peg. Openness is not statistically 
significant. The positive coefficient on the external debt variable contradicts the “fear of 
floating” hypothesis – higher levels of debt make it more difficult to peg. Overall the 
preferences model does not perform as well as the political / institutional model, despite 
being estimated on a larger dataset.  
 
Regressions 1:6 and 1:7 use economic fundamentals variables only. Regression 1:6 is 
again estimated using a larger set of observations than the political model, but none of 
the economic variables is statistically significant. Regression 1:7 includes fiscal 
performance as an explanatory variable, which reduces the data-set to 699 observations. 
In this reduced dataset inflation is significant at the 10 per cent level with the expected 
sign. Neither economic model outperforms the institutional model. 
 
1.2 The Full Model 
Insert table 3 here 
When political, institutional and economic factors are included in the regression 
simultaneously, the main factor determining whether or not a country devalues still 
appears to be the position of the central bank in the polity. Countries with central banks 
whose governors are frequently replaced have a much raised probability of devaluation 
(regressions 2:1 – 2:3). None of the other factors describing the political institutions 
retains its explanatory power in the regressions including economic factors in regression 
2:1 to 2:3, though the expected signs are retained, with democracy raising the 
probability of devaluation while concentration of power lowers the probability of 
devaluation.  
  20The financial development variable, however, remains (mostly highly) 
significant in lowering the probability of devaluation as was expected from the 
institutional analysis: financial systems perceived as trustworthy destinations for long 
term savings are more likely to withstand interest hikes in defence of currency pegs.  
The significant positive coefficient of the GDP variable on the probability of 
devaluation confirms the optimal currency area argument, that larger economies have 
less interest in pegging the exchange rate. Another interpretation of the positive 
coefficient on the GDP variable is that it partially proxies for foreign interest in the 
country and hence the speculative pressures that can be brought to bear on a country’s 
exchange rate peg.
49 The OCA argument that more open economies would prefer 
greater currency stability is not backed up by the results in table 2.
50 
The “fear of floating” argument that a high level of external debt to GDP should 
predispose a government to maintaining the peg is not supported by the regressions and 
regression 2:3 and 2:4 contradict it. The fact that a country has a large amount of 
external debt appears to make it particularly vulnerable to reversals in investor 
confidence and hence currency crises.  
The final variable that is significant in all the regressions 2:1 to 2:4 is the year 
1997 dummy, which shows that in terms of devaluations this year was indeed 
exceptional (unlike any other year dummy). This lends support to the contagion 
hypothesis.  
None of the variables proxying for the extent of economic tensions and 
governments’ temptation to reflate their economies has an effect on the probability of 
devaluation. Lagged inflation is significant at the 10% level in regression 2:3, but the 
effect is opposite to what would be expected, as higher rates of inflation appear to lower 
the probability of devaluation. Lagged growth, the position of the current account and 
lagged changes in export prices have no significant effect on the probability of 
  21devaluation. Similarly the extent of foreign exchange reserves does not influence the 
ability of a government to maintain a peg.  
In regression 2:4 the central bank governor turnover proxy is omitted from the 
regression to test whether governor turnover is a proxy of the government’s overall 
policy preferences and hence economic outcomes. Omitting the variable produces a 
very similar pattern of results, except that the Herfindahl index of concentration of 
political power now becomes highly significant with the expected negative sign. 
Financial development continues to lower and the GDP variable raises the probability of 
devaluation and the coefficients are robust. External debt / GDP and contagion continue 
to be significant risk factors regarding the probability of devaluation. 
 
2: Factors affecting the magnitude of devaluations 
Insert table 4 here 
Unlike the question of whether or not a country devalues, the magnitude of 
devaluation appears to be dominated by economic factors. Political factors appear to 
have some effect on the size of the devaluation, but they are not robust across different 
specifications of the regression. In regression 3:1 the index of the concentration of 
power has a positive effect on the size of devaluation. This makes sense in that if 
powerful governments have the option of postponing adjustment to pegs (a negative 
effect on the probability of devaluation) then if a devaluation occurs it is more likely to 
be sizeable and again the government is less likely to be punished for this. This is 
backed up by the negative coefficient on the democracy variable in regression 3:3, 
which shows that although more democratic governments are less likely to prioritise an 
exchange rate peg over internal objectives (from table 2), they are also likely to be more 
worried about allowing large devaluations for fear of being punished for 
mismanagement. Lastly regression 3:4, which omits the central banking variable, shows 
that election years have a positive effect on the size of devaluation. Either internal 
  22balance receives priority over the exchange rate in the run-up to the election, or the 
devaluation occurs after the election and its magnitude is increased by political 
uncertainty and incoming governments breaking promises made by their predecessors.
51 
In contrast to the regressions reported in table 2, the proxy for financial 
development now has a highly significant positive coefficient, indicating that more 
developed financial systems are more vulnerable to capital outflows. 
Similarly the larger the amount of external debt / GDP the more vulnerable a 
country is to large devaluations, contrary to the fear of floating hypothesis. While “fear 
of floating” would suggest that if a devaluation cannot be avoided the government 
should do its best to limit its size, it appears that a more indebted government is less 
able to do this.  
All the regressions in table 4 confirm that the magnitude of devaluations when 
they occur is a function of the economic tensions within the economy. The higher the 
inflation rate the country experienced in the past year the higher the exchange rate 
adjustment necessary in the current year. However, the better the growth performance of 
the economy the smaller the devaluation. While the current account variable is not 
statistically significant, the lagged change in export prices is statistically significant in 
regression 3:3 where it has the expected negative sign – if export prices went up in the 
previous year there is less need for a devaluation of the exchange rate. 
Regressions 3:1 and 3:4 suggest that a high level of foreign exchange reserves 
may help a country limit the size of a devaluation, even if it is ineffective in preventing 
a devaluation. However the coefficient is only significant at the 10% level in two 
regressions and is insignificant in the other regressions. Therefore the result is not 
robust. 
Finally, while contagion appeared to be a significant factor in explaining 
whether or not a country devalued, it does not appear to have a statistically significant 
effect on the magnitude of devaluations in 1997.  
  23 
3: Discussion of Results 
3.1 Robustness of results: 
The logit regression results were tested for robustness, considering both the sensitivity 
to outliers in the dependent variables and the definition of the dependent variable. The 
results of the logit regressions are not materially altered in terms of significance levels if 
the 9 countries, which had a single central bank governor from 1990 –1999, are 
excluded from the regression. Similarly removing the four countries with more than 5 
central bank governors in the period does not alter the results significantly. The results 
for the democracy variable are sensitive to excluding the 7 highly autocratic countries 
(with democracy scores of -10 and –9). If these countries are excluded the democracy 
variable loses significance and the banking sector variable takes on significance at the 
2% level instead. When the 19 countries with very high scores of democracy (9 or 10) 
are excluded, the political variables remain significant: either at the 1% level (Central 
bank and banking sector) or the 5% level (democracy, elections and the left-wing 
government dummy) but the predictive power of the political model is reduced 
somewhat (to 67.6%). Similarly the results are robust to excluding observations with 
low concentration of power, but the Herfindahl index loses statistical significance when 
the observations with a high concentration of power (115 observation where 
concentration of power =1) are excluded from the analysis. Finally excluding the 92 
observations of extremely low banking sector development does not alter the results 
significantly, but the significance of the banking sector variable and the fit of the 
regression are improved if the 84 observations of highly developed financial systems 
(such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Malta and Cyprus) are excluded from the regressions. 
 
  24The results reported for the logit analysis (whether or not a devaluation occurs) used a 
devaluation greater than 2% as the cut-off point for the dependent variable. If the 
dependent variable is reclassified using a devaluation of 5% as the threshold, the 
election year dummy in the political model loses statistical significance, the significance 
level of the democracy variable declines to 5%, the banking sector variable is significant 
at the 5% level rather than the 1% level in regressions 1:1 and 1:2. The concentration of 
power is only significant at the 10% level in all four regressions.   
 
Regressions 1:1 to 1:4 and 2:1 to 2:3 show the central importance of the central bank’s 
position in the polity. But it is also possible that there is an endogeneity problem: the 
fact that the country devalues may cause the government to fire the central bank 
governor. This problem is partially addressed by averaging turnover over the decade. 
Moreover, regression 2:4 shows that the results obtained are not purely dependent on 
the inclusion of the central banking variable, but that the explanatory power of the 
model is maintained when the central bank variable is omitted. Instead the concentration 
of power variable, the GDP variable and the external debt variable take on additional 
significance and the inflation rate changes to the expected positive sign. This suggests 
that there is a problem of multicollinearity in the data. However, the correlation 
coefficients between governor turnover and the Herfindahl index is the highest at 0.25, 
the lagged inflation rate 0.22, Log of GDP 0.16 and external debt 0.01.  
 
3.2. Interpretation of Results: 
The regression results reported in tables 2 and 3 show that the model correctly predicts 
just over 70% of devaluation / stability observations. Interestingly the predictions of the 
full model controlling for economic factors and the contagion effect in 1997 does not 
perform significantly better than the “pure” institutional model. Indeed most of the 
additional explanatory power arises from the 1997 dummy. Economic variables become 
  25significant in the linear regression models of table 4, where variables capturing 
economic pressures to devalue are highly and robustly significant.  
 
Looking at specific country cases, the logit models correctly predict devaluation 
probabilities in excess of 80% throughout the period for countries like Venezuela, on 
account of its low financial development and its 4 central bank governors in the 1990s, 
plus a relatively democratic and decentralized polity. On the other side of the spectrum, 
the model correctly predicts extreme stability for all the Gulf States with their 
autocratic, centralized polities and generally long-lived central bankers, as well as 
relatively well-developed financial sectors. Pure institutional models predict devaluation 
probabilities of about 25% for Saudi Arabia through the decade, while the mixed 
models hover around 35% devaluation probability. For countries that have experienced 
a process of democratization the models correctly predict increasing vulnerability. For 
example the probability of devaluation in South Africa rises by 15 percentage points 
between 1990 and 2000. However, for countries, which have a mixed pattern of 
episodes of stability and years of devaluation, the models are often not sensitive enough 
to predict year on year performance, except for instability associated with elections and 
contagion in 1997.  
 
For an imaginary country at the mean of the sample distribution – what are the effects of 
changing the statistically significant explanatory variables?
52 In the institutional model 
of regression 1:2 a country at the mean of the sample distribution has a 70.2% 
probability of devaluation. A hypothetical country with all the worst characteristics has 
a near certainty of devaluation and a country with all the best characteristics has almost 
no risk of devaluation (results presented in Table 5). If a country at the mean of the 
sample distribution has just one additional central bank governor the probability of 
devaluation rises by 11%. Similarly moving from the mildly democratic mean to a fully 
  26democratic polity raises the probability of devaluation by 9.3%. Finally, election years 
in a country at the mean raise the probability of devaluation by 15 percentage points.  
 
For the full model including economic and control variables (regression 2.2) the 
hypothetical country at the sample mean has a probability of devaluation of 72.3%. For 
the mean observation of country-years with stable exchange rates the probability of 
devaluation is 55.7%. This rises to 77.9% for the mean of the observations in which a 
devaluation occurred. Holding all variables at the sample mean but adding an extra 
central bank governor raises the probability of devaluation by 6.5 percentage points, 
while contagion effects in 1997 increased the probability of devaluation by 10.3 
percentage points. If a country at the sample mean increases its financial development 
by one standard deviation (29.2%) then the probability of devaluation is reduced by 
11.6% and a country at the maximum level of financial development (and all other 




Many developing countries continue to prefer “intermediate” exchange rate regimes to 
the “corner solutions” of free floats or hard pegs supported by currency boards or 
outright monetary unions even after the series of currency crises of the 1990s.
53 If 
countries continue to manage their exchange rate, policy advice on how to make such 
regimes stable is important. This paper used LDC data to analyse the factors 
determining the probability of devaluation and then compared them to the factors that 
determine the magnitude of a devaluation in country-year observations where a 
devaluation occurred. Potential explanatory variables were drawn from a review of the 
literatures on regime choice and on currency crises.  
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It was shown that institutional factors play an important role in determining whether or 
not a less developed country devalues. Of particular importance appears to be the 
central bank’s time horizon. Under strong governments the probability of devaluation 
seems to be lower. The strength of the financial sector also plays a role in determining 
the probability of devaluation, with more developed financial sectors more able to cope 
with the monetary implications of maintaining a peg. Further factors undermining the 
ability to maintain a peg are the level of foreign debt and contagion factors. The degree 
of economic imbalances in an economy, however, seems to have little explanatory 
power when it comes to the maintenance of a stable exchange rate in a given year. 
 
A different picture emerges from the analysis of the determinants of the size of 
devaluation where economic pressures such as the inflation rate and the growth 
performance of the economy dominate. While the coefficients of the institutional factors 
maintain their expected signs, the coefficients are no longer robust to different 
specifications of the regression, though there is limited evidence that highly 
concentrated polities have larger devaluations and more democratic countries limit the 
size of devaluations. Election years seem to produce greater devaluations than non-
election years. The only robust institutional variable is the financial sector variable. 
However, in contrast to the logit analysis, greater levels of financial development have a 
positive effect on the magnitude of devaluation, perhaps because more developed 
systems facilitate greater capital outflows. 
 
The regression results indicate that a devaluation is a two-stage process. The decision 
whether or not to devalue is influenced mainly by the institutional set-up of the country, 
which determines whether a pegged exchange rate arrangement appears to be credible. 
Once a country decides to float, however, the size of the devaluation is mainly driven by 
  28economic fundamentals, though there is some evidence to suggest that democratically 
elected governments may try to limit devaluations. Future research should concentrate 
on refining the proxies for the political, central banking and particularly the financial 
fragility proxies. This would allow us to draw more specific conclusions for policy 
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Descriptive Statistics: Mean values 
 




Central Bank governor turnover  0.296  0.252 
 
0.322 
Democracy 0.927  -7.288 
 
1.851 
Concentration of Power  0.513  0.557 
 
0.487 
Election Year  0.241  0.198 
 
0.264 
(M3 – M1) / GDP  29.66  39.918 
 
23.822 
Log GDP  22.604  22.393 
 
22.637 
Openness (%)  82.19  97.20 
 
74.63 




Lagged Inflation (%)  118.79  34.37  167.51 
Lagged growth (%)  2.72  3.60 
 
2.22 
Lagged current account / GDP (%)  -8.59  -8.09  -8.88 
Lagged Fiscal deficit  -2.82  -2.28  -3.16 
Lagged change in exports prices 
(%) 
2.03 3.852  1.07 
Lagged log of foreign exchange 
reserves 
5.883 5.972  5.833 
Year 1997  0.09  0.06  0.11 
 
  35Table II: 
Political / Institutional Model 
 
Regression  number  1:1 1:2 1:3  1:4 



















Leftdummy    0.390 
(0.300) 
  0.272 
(0.298) 
















Constant  -0.948 -0.907 -0.281  -0.272 
Number  of  Observations  934 934 882  882 






Regression number  1:5 
GDP / Capita  -0.0002**
(0.0001) 
Openness  -0.001 
(0.003) 
Log GDP  0.187** 
(0.083) 




# of Observations  1234 







*, ** and *** represent significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively 









Regression number 1:6  1:7 
































                                                 
54 Estimated on full set of observations but 
predictions restricted to same dataset as 
institutional model 






  36Table III: 
Factors Affecting the Probability of Devaluation – controlling for economic 
conditions 
 
Regression number  2:1  2:2  2:3  2:4 









Democracy   0.026 
(0.027) 
  
Concentration of Power  -0.598 
(0.526) 


































































Lagged change in export prices      0.001 
(0.007) 
 


















Constant -3.076  -2.308  -3.218  -2.602 
Number of Observations  640  686  583  799 
% correctly predicted  73.1  73.8  71.7  73.3 
 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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Table IV: 
Factors Determining the Size of Devaluation 
 
Regression number  3:1  3:2  3:3  3:4 














Concentration of Power  0.151* 
(0.092) 
   0.115   
(0.077) 






























































Lagged change in export prices      -0.002* 
(0.001) 
 


















Constant -0.618  -0.649  -0.802  -0.561 
        
Overall R-Squared  0.3517  0.3157  0.3072  0.354 
Number of Observations  447  441  441  538 
 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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Table V: 





mean   











1.751 5.3253 0.032  2.343  1.751  1.751 
Democracy  0.055*** 
 
0.050 0.55  -18.51 0.050  0.55  0.050 
Election Year  0.512** 
 
0.123 0.512 0  0.123  0.123  0.512 




-0.266 -0.006 -1.998 -0.266  -0.266  -0.266 
Leftdummy 0.390 
 
0.105 0.39  0  0.105  0.105  0.105 
Constant -0.907 
 
-0.907 -0.907 -0.907 -0.907  -0.907  -0.907 
Xβ 
 
  0.85 5.86 -21.38 1.449 1.356  1.745 
Probability   0.702 0.997 0  0.81  0.795  0.851   40
Table VI: 


















1.056 0.899  1.149  1.413  1.056 1.056 
Democracy 0.026 
(0.027) 
0.024 -0.189  0.048  0.024  0.024 0.024 
Election Year  0.305 
(0.246) 
0.073 0.06  0.081  0.073  0.073 0.073 




-0.534 -0.719  -0.429  -0.534  -0.534 -1.059 
Log GDP  0.141 
(0.133) 
3.187 3.157  3.191  3.187  3.187 3.187 
Openness -0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.411 -0.486  -0.373  -0.411  -0.411 -0.411 




0.361 0.305  0.391  0.361  0.361 0.361 




-0.066 -0.052  -0.073  -0.066  -0.066 -0.066 
Lagged growth  -0.019 
(0.016) 
0.035 0.047  0.029  0.035  0.035 0.035 
Lagged current 
account / GDP 
0.003 
(0.014) 
-0.026 -0.024  -0.027  -0.026  -0.026 -0.026 






-0.494 -0.502  -0.490  -0.494  -0.494 -0.494 
Year 1997  0.659* 
(0.359) 
0.059 0.039  0.072  0.059  0.659 0.059 
Constant -2.308  -2.308 -2.308  -2.308  -2.308  -2.308 -2.308 
Xβ   0.959  0.228  1.261  1.316  1.558  0.434 
Probability   0.723 0.557  0.779  0.788  0.826 0.607 
 
 